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INTRODUCTION 
To understand the psychological motivations and constraints of ter-
rorists considering nuclear terrorism, it is necessary first to identify the 
important features of their individual, group and organizational 
psychology. While there is no one terrorist "mindset," there is a pattern 
of psycho-social vulnerabilities that renders terrorists especially suscepti-
ble to the powerful influences of group and organizational dynamics. In 
particular, the act of joining a terrorist group represents for many an at-
tempt to consolidate an incomplete psycho-social identity. A common 
feature is an unusually strong motivation to belong, coupled with a 
tendency to externalize, to blame the establishment for personal failures. 
These characteristics set the stage for terrorist group members to be 
unusually susceptible to the forces of group dynamics. As a consequence, 
there is a tendency for individual judgment to be suspended so that con-
forming behavior results. Many of the features of "groupthink," with its 
accompanying tendency toward risky decision-making, are present. 
In considering the implications of these psychological understan-
dings to the specific case of nuclear terrorism, it is emphasized that 
distorted decision-making does not equate to totally irrational decision-
making. In certain circumstances however, the distorted individual and 
group decision-making psychology could indeed influence the group 
toward a high risk option such as nuclear terrorism. 
For terrorists operating within their own national boundaries, a ter-
rorist act producing mass casualties would generally be counter-
productive. For groups acting across national boundaries, however, this 
constraint does not apply to nearly the same degree. While the op-
probrium of the West will be a constraint for some, it will not be equally 
the case for all terrorist groups. The degree of disincentive will relate in 
particular to the major audience of influence. Thus, Shi'ite fundamen-
talist terrorists would be less constrained than radical Palestinians, who 
would in turn be less constrained than more moderate Palestinian 
groups. Finally, there are the terrorist "losers" who are being shunted 
aside and losing the recognition they seek. Such a group could justify a 
terrorist spectacular in order to regain influence on the basis of a "what 
have we got to lose" rationale. Other scenarios are suggested in which 
terrorist groups could conclude that an act of nuclear terrorism was re-
quired. 
In thinking about the possibility of nuclear terrorism, it is important 
to distinguish between the actual detonation of a device and the use of a 
device for extortion and influence. The constraints against the latter are 
significantly reduced in contrast to acts producing mass casualties. The 
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constraints are even more reduced in the case of the plausible nuclear 
hoax, an option that can be expected to become more frequent. 
PROSPECTS FOR NUCLEAR TERRORISM: 
PSYCHOLOGICAL MOTIVATIONS AND CONSTRAINTS 
Comprehensive analyses of the prospects for nuclear terrorism in-
evitably address two major considerations: technological and 
psychological. What is striking about these analyses is the great disparity 
between the scrupulous attention devoted to technological considerations 
and the cursory attention given to psychological ones. An example of this 
disparity is the frequently cited study Nuclear Theft: Risks and 
Safeguards by Mason Willrich and Theodore Taylor1, prepared for the 
Energy Policy Project of the Ford Foundation. The authors provide 
rigorous analyses of the materials, technology, skills and resources 
necessary to construct a crude fission bomb or radiological weapon. 
They also give thorough attention to the requirements and elements of 
nuclear safeguards systems. Their attention to detail is exacting. In con-
trast, only ten of the book's 252 pages are devoted to examining terrorist 
motivations and intentions and even that limited treatment is descriptive 
and superficial. 
Thus, we are in the paradoxical position of having a clearer 
understanding of the interior of the atom than we do of the interior of 
the mind of the terrorist. In the absence of a clear understanding of our 
adversary's intentions, we tend to develop tactics and strategies that are 
based primarily on our knowledge of his technological capabilities, and 
give insufficient weight to his psychological motivations. 
This essay aims, on an admittedly small scale, to redress this im-
balance concerning nuclear terrorism, so that the development of tactics 
and strategies is informed by an understanding of the individual, group, 
and organizational psychology of terrorism. 
IRRATIONAL ACT OR RATIONAL CHOICE? 
In considering the potential for nuclear terrorism, Brian Jenkins 
observes that the historical record does not contain incidents in which 
terrorist groups have attempted to acquire fissile material for use in a 
nuclear device. Moreover, he observed that inflicting mass casualties is 
usually inconsistent with the goals of terrorist groups. 
On the other hand, when Jenkins considers the category of 
psychotic individuals, he is led to observe that "nuts are probably 
responsible for many of the low-level incidents and nuclear hoaxes" and 
that "lunatics have been perpetrators of many schemes of mass 
murder." He concludes that on the basis of intentions alone, psychotics 
are potential nuclear terrorists, but in terms of capabilities they are the 
least able to acquire nuclear weapons.2 
While agreeing with the overall thrust of Jenkins' arguments, an 
overly quick reading of his analysis could lead to the false conclusion 
that the major danger is from irrational actors—from psychotic 
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individuals acting alone or in small groups. One could go on to conclude 
—again falsely—that there is little or no danger from political terrorists, 
since political terrorist groups tend for the most part to guide their 
decision-making in accordance with rational political considerations and 
it does not seem to be in the rational interest of political terrorist groups 
to engage in nuclear terrorism. 
But, as Jenkins would be the first to agree, this thinking revolves 
around a false dichotomy. In reality, there is a great deal of territory bet-
ween irrationality and rationality. Moreover, rational terrorists may 
reason quite logically, but the fixed premises that are at the basis of their 
rational calculus can lead to a psycho-logic that has dreadful conse-
quences. 
TERRORIST PSYCHO-LOGIC 
In dissecting terrorist psycho-logic, it is necessary to utilize three dif-
ferent levels of analysis: individual psychology, group psychology, and 
organizational psychology. 
Comparative studies3 of terrorist psychology do not indicate a uni-
que "terrorist mind." Terrorists do not fit into a specific psychiatric 
diagnostic category. Indeed, most would be considered to fit within the 
spectrum of normality. Yet, it is difficult to conceptualize a 
psychologically normal individual who would carry out an act of mass 
destruction. An attempt to construct a psychology that would both lead 
an individual to be motivated to carry out an act of nuclear terrorism and 
have the wherewithal to implement it quickly reveals a paradox. On the 
one hand, to be motivated to carry out an act of mass destruction sug-
gests profound psychological distortions usually found only in severely 
disturbed individuals—such as paranoid psychotics. On the other hand, 
to implement an act of nuclear terrorism requires not only organizational 
skills but also the ability to cooperate with a small team. To be suffering 
from major psychopathology—such as paranoid psychotic states—is in-
compatible with being able to work effectively with a small group. 
Based on this understanding of terrorist psychology, one can agree 
with Jenkins' observation that the psychotic individuals could be—and 
have been—responsible for nuclear hoaxes. 
PSYCHO-SOCIAL VULNERABILITIES 
While there is no unique terrorist mindset, there is a pattern of 
psycho-social vulnerabilities that renders those who become terrorists 
particularly susceptible to the powerful influences of group and 
organizational dynamics. In particular there are data that suggest that 
the act of joining a terrorist group represents an attempt to consolidate 
an incomplete psycho-social identity. Within the broad array of terrorist 
groups with their disparate causes, a common feature is an unusually 
strong motivation to belong which is coupled with a tendency to exter-
nalize, to seek outside sources for personal inadequacies. 
The major study sponsored by the Ministry of the Interior of the 
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Federal Republic of Germany is illustrative. The study of the 
epidemiology of terrorism found 25 percent of terrorists had lost one or 
both parents by age 14; fully a third had been convicted in juvenile court; 
there was a high frequency of job and educational failure. The lives of 
the terrorists before joining were characterized by social isolation and 
personal failure. For these lonely, alienated individuals from the margins 
of society, the terrorist group was to become the family they never had. 
This alienation from the family is characteristic of a major class of 
terrorists whose psychological motivations were discussed by the author 
in earlier work5—the "anarchic-ideologues." This class, of which the 
Red Army Faction and the Red Brigades are examples, have turned 
against the generation of their parents, which is identified with the 
establishment. They are dissident to parents loyal to the regime. 
In apparent contrast, the "nationalist-separatists," such as ETA of 
the Basques or the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia 
(ASALA), are carrying on a family mission: they are loyal to families 
dissident to the establishment. But while they are not estranged from 
their families, as are the "anarchic-ideologues," they are not at one with 
their societies. Thus, they too have fragmented psycho-social identities, 
and for them, joining a terrorist group is also an attempt to consolidate 
those identities. 
To recapitulate, from the perspective of individual psychology, ter-
rorists are not in the main suffering from serious psychopathology. They 
do not suffer from mental illness that could lead to the profound distor-
tions of motivation and reality testing one would expect to be associated 
with the driven desire to carry out an act of mass destruction. At the 
same time, they suffer from psycho-social wounds that predispose them 
to seek affiliation with like-minded individuals. This strong affiliative 
need, coupled with an incomplete personal identity, provides the founda-
tion for especially powerful group dynamics. 
If the foregoing line of reasoning is correct, it suggests that the ter-
rorist group is an unusually powerful setting for producing conforming 
behavior.6 Insofar as the individual psycho-social identity is incomplete 
or fragmented, the only way the member feels reasonably complete is in 
relation to the group. Belonging to the terrorist group thus for many 
becomes the most important component of their psycho-social identity. 
Indeed, data from terrorist memoirs and from interviews with terrorists 
suggest that there is a tendency to submerge the individual identity into a 
group identity. The fact that individual terrorists subordinate their own 
judgment to that of the group has major implications for the question of 
whether a terrorist group would engage in an act of nuclear terrorism. 
A summary review of the evidence, both direct and indirect, bearing 
on the group dynamics of political terrorism helps clarify this issue. The 
strong need to belong, referred to earlier, becomes a major lever for en-
suring compliance of group members. Andreas Baader, a founder of the 
Baader-Meinhof gang, used the threat of expulsion to ensure com-
pliance.7 In response to members who expressed doubt about the group's 
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violent tactics, he indicated that "whoever is in the group simply has to 
be tough, has to be able to hold out, and if one is not tough enough, 
there is not room for him here." Professor Wanda Baeyer-Kaette,8 who 
had unusual access to members of the Heidelberg cell of the Red Army 
Faction, cites the example of a new recruit discussing an operation that 
had a high probability of producing a high casualty rate. When Baeyer-
Kaette questioned whether it was ideologically proper to conduct an 
operation where innocent blood would be shed, a heavy silence fell over 
the room. It quickly became apparent that to question the decision was 
to be seen as disloyal. Moreover, to question the group judgment was to 
risk losing a newly won place in the group. 
In fact, the risks may be much more consequential than the mere 
loss of one's membership. Several members conveyed the fear that once 
in the group, the only way out was feet first. To disagree actively with the 
group and be perceived as dissident was to risk not just membership but 
life itself. Baumann' stated that withdrawal was impossible except "by 
way of the graveyard." Boock,10 a former Red Army Faction member, 
commented that the intensity of the pressures "can lead to things you 
can't imagine...the fear of what is happening to one when you say, for 
example, 'No, I won't do that, and for these and these reasons.' What 
the consequences of that can be ." 
Thus, there are great pressures for compliance and conformity 
which mute dissent. Consider the dilemma of the doubting group 
member, at once desirous of belonging, yet uncomfortable about an ac-
tion that runs counter to his principles. For him, the ideological rhetoric 
plays an especially important role, providing the justification for the 
contemplated anti-social act. Indeed, as Baeyer-Kaette" has noted, there 
is a remarkable upside-down logic which characterizes terrorist group 
discussions. But there is a psycho-logic to the reasoning if one accepts the 
basic premise that what the group defines as good is desirable, and what 
the group defines as bad is evil. If the group cause is served by a par-
ticular act, no matter how heinous, the act is, by definition, good. 
ABSOLUTIST RHETORIC 
The rhetoric of terrorism is absolutist, idealizing and devaluing, 
polarizing "us versus them," good versus evil. What is within the group 
is not to be questioned, is ideal. What is outside the group—the 
establishment—is the cause of society's ills and is bad. 
Throughout the broad spectrum of terrorist groups, no matter how 
diverse their cause, the absolutist rhetoric is remarkably similar. That ab-
solutist rhetoric is characterized by narcissistic splitting. Splitting12 is an 
important psychological characteristic of individuals with narcissistic 
and borderline personality distrubances,13 personality disorders that are 
disproportionately represented in the terrorist population. Lorenz Boll-
inger,14 who has had the unusual opportunity of conducting in-depth 
psychoanalytic interviews of Red Army Faction terrorists, found a strik-
ing preponderence of borderline mechanisms, especially splitting and 
projecting onto the establishment the devalued aspects of the self while 
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concomitantly idealizing the group. To the extent that the terrorist 
ideology devalues and dehumanizes the establishment and identifies it as 
the cause of society's (the terrorists') problems, not only does it become 
not immoral to attempt to destroy the establishment, it becomes, indeed, 
the highest order of morality. By the terrorists' upside-down logic, 
destroying the establishment is destroying the source of evil, and only 
good can result. 
A brief excursion into indirect evidence is also in order. Studies of 
the membership of the Unification Church of Reverend Sun Yung Moon 
are particularly instructive.15 They indicate that the more isolated and 
unaffiliated the individual was in terms of family and friends before join-
ing, the more likely he was to find membership in the church attractive. 
Further, the greater the emotional relief he found upon joining, the more 
likely he was to accept instruction to participate in anti-social acts. For 
the purposes of this comparison, recall the remarkable mass engagement 
ceremony in Madison Square Garden, where Revered Moon assigned 
fiances to 1,410 members. The individuals who found their entire self-
definition in the Unification Church were the individuals willing to ac-
cept blindly an assigned marital partner, a step that was surely contrary 
to the social mores to which these individuals had been socialized. 
A further major contribution to the power of the group over its 
members derives from the relationship between the group and its sur-
rounding society. For the underground group isolated from society in 
particular, group cohesion develops in response to shared danger. In the 
words of a member of the Red Army Faction," group solidarity was 
"compelled exclusively by the illegal situation, fashioned into a common 
destiny." According to the testimony of another member, "the group 
was born under the pressure of pursuit" and that pressure was "the sole 
link holding the group together."17 
Thus, the terrorist group represents almost a caricature version of 
the "fight-flight" group described by Bion.1" The "fight-flight" group 
acts in opposition to the outside world, which both threatens and 
justifies its existence. The "fight-flight" group perceives that the only 
way for it to preserve itself is by fighting against or fleeing from the 
enemy out to destroy it. This belief that the enemy is out to destroy it is 
not merely a paranoid delusion. While initially it may derive from inter-
nal psychological assumptions, as a consequence of terrorist acts the 
psychological assumption becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. The ter-
rorist group successfully creates an outside world that in fact is out to 
destroy it. 
Whatever psychological pressures are within the individual ter-
rorists, whatever psychological tensions are within the group—these ten-
sions are externalized. Terrorist groups require enemies in order to cope 
with themselves. If such enemies do not exist, they create them, for if 
they cannot act against an outside enemy, they will tear themselves apart. 
As the foregoing review indicates, there is a pattern of behavior that 
indicates that the predominant determinant of terrorist actions is the 
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internal dynamics of the terrorist group. If the terrorist group does not 
achieve recognition as a feared opponent of the establishment, it loses its 
meaning. If the terrorist group does not commit acts of terrorism, it loses 
its meaning. A terrorist group needs to commit acts of terrorism in order 
to justify its existence, and it needs to be recognized as a feared opponent 
in its "fantasy war" against society. 
TERRORIST DECISION-MAKING 
If this characterization of the psychology within the pressure cooker 
of the terrorist group is apt, what are the implications for group decision-
making? Would a group able to rationalize that its causes 
justify—indeed require—wreaking violence on innocent victims be 
similarly able to rationalize the mass destruction of nuclear terrorism? Is 
it a quantum leap, an unbridgeable gulf, or merely an incremental and 
inevitable step as terrorist acts escalate in magnitude? Can we construct a 
terrorist psycho-logic that not only permits but requires nuclear ter-
rorism? 
In addressing this question, it is important to emphasize that more 
than most decision-making groups, for reasons elaborated above, in-
dividual judgment tends to be suspended and subordinated to the group 
process. Thus the focus of this inquiry is not whether individual terrorists 
could make such a catastrophic decision, but whether a group deciding as 
a group could do so. 
This approach requires us to address the phenomenon identified by 
Janis" as "groupthink." Occurring when groups make decisions in times 
of crisis, it is defined as: 
high cohesiveness and . . . an accompanying 
concurrence-seeking tendency people engage in when 
they are deeply involved in a cohesive in-group, when 
the members' strivings for unanimity override their 
motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses 
of action ... a deterioration of mental efficiency, reality 
testing, and normal judgment that results from in-group 
pressures. 
The symptoms of groupthink include: 
(1) Illusions of invulnerability leading to excessive optimism and 
excessive risk-taking; 
(2) Collective rationalization efforts to dismiss challenges to key 
assumptions; 
(3) Presumption of the group's morality; 
(4) Unidimensional perception of the enemy as evil (thereby de-
nying the feasibility of negotiation) or incompetent (thereby 
justifying risky alternatives); 
(5) Intolerance of challenges by a group member to shared key 
beliefs; 
(6) Unwillingness to express views which deviate from the 
perceived group consensus; 
(7) A shared illusion that unanimity is genuine; and 
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(8) The emergence of members who withhold adverse informa-
tion concerning the instrumental and moral soundness of its 
decision from the group. 
This cluster of traits that Janis has labelled groupthink would seem 
to epitomize the decision-making of the terrorist group. Of particular im-
portance are the reduction of critical judgment, the assumption of the 
group's morality, and the illusion of invulnerability leading to excessive 
risk-taking. 
Semel and Minix20 have specifically investigated the effects of group 
dynamics on risk-taking. In a group problem-solving task, they found 
that US Army groups shifted in the direction of riskier policy choices 
than individual members preferred privately. Individual tendencies were 
strongly reinforced and intensified as a result of interactions within the 
group. Moreover, the tendency of group members to conform to the 
preferences of the group was found to increase with the length of their in-
teraction with the group. 
The phenomena described by Janis and by Semel and Minix occur 
with psychologically healthy mature adults. If mature adults with healthy 
self-esteem and appreciation of their own individuality can slip into such 
flawed decision-making under the pressures of group dynamics, what of 
groups composed of individuals with weak self-esteem who depend upon 
the group for their sense of significance? Does this circumstance not sug-
gest that these groups would be subject to distorted decision-making to a 
magnified degree? 
However, distorted decision-making is not equivalent to total irra-
tionality. Looking at the world through distorted lenses is not equivalent 
to being blind or being subject to visual hallucinations. Is there a 
"psycho-logic" that, under the pressure of distorted decision-making 
processes, could lead a terrorist group to opt for weapons of mass 
destruction? Jenkins21 has noted that "terrorists want a lot of people 
watching, not a lot of people dead....Mass casualties may not serve the 
terrorist goals and could alienate the population." Yet, are there cir-
cumstances in which the upside-down logic of terrorists could lead them 
to want a lot of people dead, where they could be drawn to conclude that 
mass casualties could serve their goals and could do so without alienating 
the population? If there is a psycho-logic that could lead a group down 
that path, might not the distorted decision-making descirbed above make 
the difference in a close decision? 
It is useful to invoke here a proposition advanced by Ariel Merari.22 
He has made an important distinction between domestic terrorists acting 
on their own territory and those acting on the soil of other nations. Such 
groups as the Red Army Faction and the Red Brigades believe they are in 
the vanguard of a social-revolutionary movement. They aspire to per-
suade their countrymen to join their fantasy war against the establish-
ment, and they depend upon their countrymen for both active and 
passive support. In attempting to draw attention to their cause through 
acts of terrorism, it is their countrymen they are trying to influence. The 
54 
Conflict Quarterly 
same is true for ETA when it is acting in the Basque region. 
In vivid contrast, when a group operates across borders, the rules of 
the game in terms of the target of influence are quite different. As Merari 
has emphasized, when Palestinian terrorists operate in Israel, the horror 
and disapprobation of the population in the target country are not a 
disincentive, they are a reward. 
The issue of audience comes into play, too. In the media age each 
act has multiple audiences. If a group of moderate Palestians, in con-
sidering a particular action, came to believe that the act would invoke in-
ternational opprobrium, that would mitigate against the action, for they 
very much value and need Western approval, and would see the act as 
having the potential for being a setback to the Palestinian cause. In con-
trast, for radical Shi'ite terrorism, different weights are probably attach-
ed to the reactions of different sectors of the international audience. The 
degree to which the West is alienated by a particular act is probably not a 
major disincentive. The key point is that a group acting across borders is 
significantly less constrained than one operating within its own national 
boundaries. It is the contention of the author that the greatest dangers lie 
with these groups. 
THE POTENTIAL FOR NUCLEAR TERRORISM 
An examination of the historical record provides a certain degree of 
comfort. However distorted their reasoning, their special psychological 
calculus, thus far terrorist groups have concluded that nuclear terrorism 
would not advance their cause and have rejected that option. 
Lest one draw false comfort from that historical record, however, a 
scenario could be suggested where a group might well conclude that 
honor compels it to perpetrate an act of mass violence and that such an 
act would advance its just cause. Indeed, the scenario is not a product of 
fantasy, but might well have occurred had it not been for the alertness of 
the Israeli counter-intelligence forces. 
In the spiralling cycle of violence begetting violence that characteriz-
ed the Middle East, an act of terrorism was planned and set into motion 
that, had it succeeded, would have had catastrophic consequences and 
could easily have provided a plausible rationale for nuclear terrorist 
response. 
When one thinks of Middle East terrorists, one is inclined to think 
only of radical Palestinian groups or Shi'ite groups such as Amal or Hiz-
ballah. In this case, however, the terrorists were zealous Jewish fun-
damentalists—millenarian Kabbalists—who had formed a cell within 
Gush Emunim.23 Their logic was no less twisted than that of their Arab 
adversaries. Reasoning with a fundamentalist logic which has been 
analyzed by Ehud Springzak,24 an Israeli political scientist, they planned 
to destroy the two holiest Islamic mosques in Jerusalem, two of the 
holiest sites in the Islamic world, the El Aksa Mosque and the Mosque of 
Omar (The Dome of the Rock). Only the holy sites in Mecca and Medina 
are more important than the El Aksa Mosque, which is described in the 
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Koran as the site at which Mohammad began his ninth journey. Built in 
732 A.D., it has been the scene of violence in the past, for it was on its 
steps that King Abdallah of Trans-Jordan was assassinated in 1951, to be 
succeeded after a brief interregnum by his grandson King Hussein, who 
was at his side. Built in 1691, the Mosque of Omar is considered by many 
to be the most magnificent shrine in all of Jerusalem. 
It is instructive to dwell for a moment on the logic of the Jewish ter-
rorists, for it is an example—and a horrifying one—of the psychological 
blinders that terrorists can wear, of the twisted psycho-logic that can lead 
to actions which can shape history. In planning the destruction of the ho-
ly sites, they did not consider their planned action to be an anti-Arab act, 
nor did they dwell on the consequences in the Arab world to any signifi-
cant degree. Their perspective was quite simple. The El Aksa Mosque 
stood on the "Temple Mount," the holiest place in Judaism. The Mos-
que was believed to stand on the very place where Abraham was in-
structed to sacrifice his son Isaac and was the site of the First Temple 
(built by Solomon in 970 B.C.) and of the Second Temple. 
The Millenarians believe that redemption and the coming of the 
Messiah are due for the year 6000 (Jewish calendar). The Kabbalist 
millenarians feel that they can help it happen, and if that is not done, the 
coming of the Messiah may be postponed for another thousand years. 
This is why the Kabbalist band thought they had to "help" by removing 
the Muslim shrines, since according to their belief the Messiah will 
rebuild the Jewish Temple. For the fundamentalist Jewish terrorists, the 
planned destruction of the Islamic holy sites was necessary to restore the 
Temple Mount to its original form. 
Had they succeeded, there is little doubt that a jihad of world wide 
proportions would have resulted. In that climate, it is suggested nuclear 
terrorism against Israel would have been considered fully justified by 
many in the Islamic world. 
There is another scenario worth considering, perhaps less extreme, 
but potentially as far-reaching in its consequences. It is not, perhaps, 
beyond the pale to imagine a terrorist cell in West Germany, obsessed 
with an escalating arms race, persuading itself that the only way to avoid 
a nuclear holocaust would be forcibly to call attention to its 
humanitarian cause, and that the most effective way to do that would be 
to seize a nuclear weapon, not for the purpose of detonating it, but as the 
means of capturing the world's attention. Should such an event occur, it 
could have profoundly destabilizing effects upon the NATO alliance and 
the policies of the NATO countries most concerned with the forward 
deployment of Pershing lis. 
In the two examples considered above, the author has moved from 
considering terrorists actually detonating a nuclear device to their seizing 
a device in order to dramatize a cause. The next logical step in this pro-
gression is one that, from the point of view of the terrorist group, would 
involve even less profound consequences and hence would be more readi-
ly considered—the nuclear terrorist hoax. If it is technically feasible for a 
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group with a certain range of scientific and engineering abilities to con-
struct a primitive nuclear device, it is certainly much less complicated for 
it to mount a plausible hoax. 
While there have been a number of such episodes, it is puzzling that 
they have not been more frequent. A highly persuasive nuclear terrorist 
threat can have major consequences. Even though the probability may be 
judged quite low, were a group to provide plausible evidence that it had 
fissile material, could decision-makers afford to ignore its demands? One 
of the major difficulties with the low probability/high consequence act 
of high technology terrorism is that it tends to throw normal procedures 
out the window. Thus, while it is generally recommended that senior 
policy-makers avoid becoming involved in terrorist incidents, should a 
plausible nuclear terrorism threat be raised, it would be difficult if not 
impossible for them to avoid becoming actively involved in dealing with 
the crisis. High-level involvement automatically changes the nature of 
the crisis and would in itself constitute a success from the terrorists' 
perspective. 
The possibility of nuclear terrorism is usually discounted because of 
the historical record and the logic that it would not serve the terrorists' 
goals. It seems highly likely that plausible nuclear hoaxes will be seen 
with increasing frequency. Certainly, it is a contingency that requires 
more active planning and preparation than it has been given. 
One final class of actors must be considered—terrorist losers. 
Despite a stated commitment to various causes, the central priority for 
any terrorist group or organization is to survive. Survival means commit-
ting acts which justify and call attention to its existence. What can be 
said of the terrorist group or faction on its way out, that has lost its sup-
port and its headlines, and in a factional struggle, has lost its influence to 
a rival group? Desperate for success, might not such a group ask, "What 
have we got to lose?" Could the pressures of group decision-making 
coupled with the requirement for organizational survival not argue for a 
nuclear spectacular as a way of regaining prominence? While the con-
straints raised earlier would continue to operate, in this case, such con-
straints might be significantly weakened. 
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